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Résumé
Les attaques du 11 septembre 2001 sur Washington et New York continuent d’influencer
la manière dont les gouvernements gèrent les déplacements de personnes, l’immigration,
la citoyenneté et la sûreté nationale. Au Canada, suite aux événements du 11 septembre,
l’une des plus contentieuses mesures envisagées en vue de garantir la sûreté nationale a été
d’introduire une carte d’identité nationale biométrique. Dans cette communication, nous
soutenons que l’effort en vue d’introduire une carte d’identité nationale biométrique est lié
à un raisonnement idéologique qui menace d’exacerber plutôt que d’apaiser les sentiments
d’insécurité nationale quant aux risques, à la citoyenneté et à la sûreté des frontières. Nous
maintenons que les technologies de contrôle de « preuve de statut », telles que les cartes
d’identité encodées biométriques, conduisent à la « tritisation » de la citoyenneté et nous
concluons que – au nom de la sûreté nationale – ces cartes d’identité risquent de
déstabiliser les spatialisations modernes de la souveraineté qu’elles sont censées protéger.
Abstract
The attacks of 11 September 2001 on Washington and New York continue to influence
how governments manage im/migration, citizenship, and national security. One of the
more contentious national security responses to the events of 9/11 in Canada has been the
drive to introduce a biometric national identification card. In this paper, we argue that the
drive for a Canadian national ID card is bound up in ideological processes which threaten
to exacerbate, rather than to alleviate, state insecurities pertaining to risk, citizenship, and
border (in) security. We maintain that ‘proof of status’ surveillance technologies, such as
biometrically-encoded ID cards, lead to the ‘securitization’ of citizenship, and we
conclude that ID cards threaten to destabilize the modern spatializations of sovereignty
that they are purported to uphold under the guise of national security.
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Today, instead of an either-or, we face a this-as-well-as-that world: national
security is no longer national security; foreign and domestic policy, national
security and international cooperation are now interlocked. Not only have the
walls between inside and outside, military and police, secret service and police
been torn down, but also the walls between innocent and guilty persons, those
under suspicion and those not under suspicion, where previously the law had
made a very strict and clear distinction. Under conditions of a universalized
perception of terrorist threats all individuals and individual rights are
transformed into a risk to the state (Beck, Bonss and Lau 2003:18).
Introduction
The intensification of national security measures following the events of 11 September
2001 (hereafter “9/11”) has increased the prevalence of state-driven surveillance projects
g l o b a l l y. In some respects, post-9/11 surveillance projects indicate the continuing
sovereign capacities of the nation-state, albeit in the context of new configurations of
citizenship and surveillance. Surveillance technologies that have hitherto been limited in
scope and application (e.g. networked public/private databases, automated monitoring
systems, biometric identifiers) proliferated in Canada and elsewhere after 9/11, and they
continue to exercise a strong influence on the ways in which citizen-subjects are identified,
processed, incorporated, and excluded. While the securitization of citizenship is occurring
in a worldwide policy environment driven by the American government’s preoccupation
with ‘border harmonization’, the international promotion and proliferation of new state
surveillance measures are also occurring in a media-amplified culture of suspicion,
insecurity, and fear.
Securitization refers to a complex sequence of relations and social processes, whereby
nation-states attempt to fortify their borders against external threats while ‘purging the
inside’ by intensifying the use of risk technologies and surveillance techniques. Biometric
national ID cards are one material manifestation of the drive for the securitization of
citizenship after 9/11. Aided by computerization and networked integration, biometric
technologies are generally purported to be an effective governing tool based on their
ability to connect individuals and groups to centers of power and information (Zureik and
Hindle, 2004). Although the protection of Canadian political clout in the post-9/11 security
environment is a component of the Canadian government’s international agenda, the drive
to introduce biometric technologies has been reinforced by a series of legislative acts
aimed at harmonizing national security practices in Canada and the U.S.A.1 However,
unlike public policy debate in the UK, which has witnessed the approval of the first stages
of ID card adoption, the drive for a national ID card in Canada has stalled in part because
1 Bill C-36 and Securing an Open Society: Canada’s National Security Policy in Canada (Privy
Council Office of the Government of Canada, 2004), US-Canada Smart Border/ 30 Point Action Plan
Update (The White House, 2001), the PATRIOT Act (2001), National Intelligence Reform Act of
2004 (2004), and the 9/11 Recommendations Implementation Act (2004) in the U.S.A.
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efforts to introduce ID cards in the U.S.A. have met with resistance.
In this paper, we examine some of the ways that access to citizenship rights has been
mediated and compromised by securitization after 9/11. As a component of the ‘War on
Te r r o r’ abroad, locating enemies within the state is a principal motivation for
securitization—as it has always been in wartime practice (Schulhofer, 2002; Muller,
2004). If state apparatuses can see and know all ‘inside the state’ by regulating the
movement of citizens and non-citizens across borders, the inside can be eliminated as a
threat to national security. Intensified surveillance measures not only imperil the ethos of
citizenship; proof of status surveillance devices may also jeopardize the notion of
sovereignty that underpins the modern political epoch.
In the first section of the paper, we consider the contemporary nature of surveillance. We
assess the impact of 9/11 on state surveillance practices, as well as the concomitant
proliferation of biometric risk technologies as a means of state governance. In the second
section, we situate the drive for a national ID card in Canada in the context of international
trends, and we demonstrate how the politics and the dynamics of state surveillance operate
within the post-9/11 context. In the final section, we address the relationship between
citizenship and surveillance. Our concern is not with the content(s) of citizenship rights,
but rather with access to rights and how they are mediated by the advent and
implementation of new surveillance technologies. While biometric national ID cards and
other proof-of-status technologies act as a means of ensuring that bona fide state citizens
are afforded access to their rights, they also work to exclude non-citizens, to increase
formal surveillance measures, and to limit distribution of citizenship rights in the context
of neo-liberal social expenditure restraints. 
Surveillance, Social Control, Securitization, and Biometrics
In one of the most influential statements on the character of social monitoring, Max Weber
(1968; 1983) differentiated administrative-based societies from the more scientific- and
technological-based ones emerging in the early twentieth century. He identified social
engineering techniques as intrinsically bound to the ascendancy of the modern capitalist
economy. Social administration, for Weber, was a product of the rationalization process—
procedural, bureaucratic means to carry out rules of legitimacy and legal authority.
Prioritizing the function of paper dossiers in the administration of the nation state, Weber
understood the accumulation and centralization of information about embodied persons as
fundamental to the execution of state power.
Whereas Weber located the surveillance function within discrete files comprised of
information on the citizenry, the proliferation of computerized data banks has increasingly
facilitated the storage, distribution, and sharing of information across state and extra-state
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agencies. The result has been that once highly restricted administrative information and
data gathering systems comprised of personal paper files have converged, to the extent that
administrative dossiers today coalesce with genetic, biometric, and visual body data
through networked systems that exchange only select pieces of information for a plethora
of reasons. Combined with the growing number of organizations that are intensifying
surveillance practices in an effort to maximize productivity, the embodied human agent,
and thus the personalized dossier, has increasingly become an adjunct to governmental
regulation. What has emerged in its place is a series of abstracted data images, categorical
representations or ‘risk profiles’, which function to classify and sort populations on the
basis of available and exploitable personal information.
Made possible by the digitalization of personal information, processes of rationalization
have increasingly morphed into automated surveillance practices (Lyon, 2003a).
Implicated in this set of processes has been a decline in the importance of the physical co-
presence of human agents, supplemented if not replaced by tokens of trust or
authentication such as bar codes, magnetic strips, PIN numbers, and passports that serve
to classify and categorize ‘data subjects’ on the basis of socio-economic status, credit
history, or insurance coverage (Lyon, 2001). Not only does this demarcate a conceptual
point of distinction from old bureaucratic organizational infrastructures, but it also
simultaneously denotes an underlying continuity with those structures based on the desire
to maximize organizational efficiency and manage contingency. Given the dispersion of
the sites of surveillance, then, the primary difference of contemporary surveillance
capabilities is not to be located exclusively in intensified forms of centralized
administration vis-à-vis digitally-based forms of rationalization; rather, a series of
integrations involving otherwise dispersed fragments of information have come together
across a range of social locations for a myriad of reasons.
In light of the fact that social categorizations are to an increasing extent created on the
basis of personal information that circulates through networked infrastructures, recent
contributions to the surveillance literature have sought to break from the argument that
monitoring involves powerful and centralized top-down forms of social control. Haggerty
and Ericson (2000), for example, conceptualize surveillance in terms of an ‘assemblage.’
They explain that the ‘surveillant assemblage’ works by breaking the human body into a
series of signifying data flows– small pieces of information, collected and stored in a large
number of computer databanks, that are available for ‘assemblage’ by a growing number
of agencies for an expanding number of reasons. The escalating number of information
sources involved in contemporary surveillance activities – e.g. traces from internet
activity, credit card use, and income tax records, as well as genetic, health, and policing
data – allows for the circulation of information through loosely integrated public and
private sector computer networks, to the extent that deliberate, top-down panoptic
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conceptions of surveillance fail to capture the complexity of present-day information
gathering and data analysis. As technologically enhanced surveillance functions become a
regular feature of everyday life, Haggerty and Ericson contend, the surveillant assemblage
has worked to level previously existing surveillance hierarchies beyond the centralized
(panoptic) state.
It is reasonable to argue that developments in contemporary surveillance capabilities have
opened spaces not previously accessible to such a wide range of diverse agencies and
organizations. Once discrete public and private-sector information storage systems have
come into contact because of the increasingly porous character of information handling
processes, to the extent that “no major population groups stand irrefutably above or
outside the surveillant assemblage” (Haggerty and Ericson, 2000: 618). The problem with
the assemblage model, however, is that it tends to suggest that centralized, asymmetrical
forms of (state) surveillance are no longer important. As Hier (2003) has demonstrated,
investigation into the expanding applications of networked surveillance systems cannot
come at the expense of insights into new and more efficient possibilities for monitoring
practices that exacerbate already existing social divisions in the context of unequal
relations of power. In focusing social analyses primarily on the expanding technological
capabilities of surveillance systems, critics run the risk of neglecting the social dimensions
and the diverse human and material implications of surveillance techniques—how they are
socially constructed, how they penetrate social groups differently, and how they can
contribute to the intensification of social inequality.
To appreciate the importance of exploring this nexus of technological and social forces,
consider the expanded range of surveillance functions introduced following 9/11. In the
aftermath of the attacks on New York and Washington, policing powers were extended in
technological realms such as wiretaps and web-based click-stream monitoring, and a range
of other technological fixes appeared around the world to monitor larger numbers of
people. Set in the context of claims to the terrorist threat, and reinforced by the repeated
visual imagery of the collapsing Twin Towers, calls for preventative security measures and
risk management techniques unleashed technological remedies in the form of iris scans,
facial recognition software, smart cards, and DNA fingerprinting (Lyon, 2003a). Although
constituted through an assemblage of technological flows of information which touched a
cross-section of the population, the application of those technological flows was not only
conceived of but unevenly applied along the socio-cultural lines of race, nationality, and
geographic origin (e.g. Ahmad, 2002; Adelman, 2002; Lyon, 2003b; Williams, 2004).
Surveillance After 9/11
Following the intelligence failure and human catastrophe of 9/11, the issue of national
security made a hasty and pronounced return to policy agendas in the U.S.A, in Canada,
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and in Europe (Shearman and Sussex, 2004). Although the alleged risks posed by various
ethno-cultural minorities and political groups contributed to the legitimizing of intensified
state surveillance in the past (see Whitaker and Marcuse, 1994), the ‘War on Terror’ has
ushered in restrictions on a new scale. In the rush towards securitization after 9/11, civil
liberties have been eroded. Accountability safeguards have likewise been disassembled,
leaving executive power unchecked and intrusive forms of surveillance with little or no
judicial oversight (Schulhofer, 2002: 66) — and ultimately threatening democratic process
itself (Gill, 2003; Huysmans, 2004). Most alarming, we have witnessed the erosion of the
distinction among law enforcement, intelligence gathering, and national security practices
(Whitaker, 2005). Citizens’ personal information is increasingly shared between agencies
willing, able, or forced2 to merge databases. In the name of national security and anti-
terrorism, too, clandestine searches by state agencies effectively provide information to
state security agencies.
State borders are symbolic spatializations of modern sovereignty and a site foremost of
new national security practices. Caught up in the intensification of data gathering and
analysis after 9/11, state surveillance practices have led to a reconstitution of the way
borders operate (Biersteker, 2003). In one sense, the ‘border is now everywhere,’ or
‘delocalized,’ such that the international political distinction between inside and outside is
less explicit (Lyon, 2003a: 147). In a second sense, 9/11 has led to a securitization of the
inside (Muller, 2004) that simultaneously alters and reinforces the distinction between
inside/outside. As Beck et al (2003:10) put it, “the state is back,” and for the oldest
Hobbesian reason – the provision of security in world risk society.
For the U.S. government and, to a lesser extent, the Canadian government, information is
a key weapon in the ‘War on Terror’. Issues of im/migration and asylum have moved to
center stage in international politics (Stevens, 2001), and novel forms of keeping track of
incomers and out-goers are being devised to catalogue and verify identities. Biometric
identification measures— face, fingerprint, and eye recognition software, for example—
comprise one set of technological capabilities to achieve these ends. Biometric devices are
systems of automatic identity authentification that utilize unique physiological
characteristics like fingerprint, face, and retinal features. Since 9/11, the production and
deployment of biometrics have accelerated (Czegledy and Czegledy, 2002). On the
surveillance horizon, it appears imminent that biometric technologies will be applied at
many points of access, especially at border crossings. In the U.S. - Canada Smart
Border/30 Point Action Plan3 enacted by former Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge
and former deputy Prime Minister John Manley in December, 2001, the implementation
2 Lowering the threshold of what is a ‘significant purpose’ to conduct searches and seizures, the USA
PATRIOT Act (2001) grossly widens the powers of intelligence-gathering agencies in the U.S.A.
Email and telephone communications can be traced on the basis of suspicion, business records may
be seized without warrants, and any number of personal records ranging from library transactions to
car rentals may be collected. 
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of biometric identification technologies tops the list. The act reads:
The United States and Canada have agreed to develop common standards for
the biometrics that we use and have also agreed to adopt interoperable and
compatible technology to read these biometrics. In the interest of having cards
that could be used across different modes of travel, we have agreed to use cards
that are capable of storing multiple biometrics (The White House, 2001).
In its first comprehensive statement on national security issues, Securing an Open Society
(Privy Council Office of the Government of Canada, 2004: 44), the Canadian government
asserted its intention to complete the Smart Border Action Plan and to apply smart border
principles around the world. The Securing an Open Society document also reveals the
Canadian government’s intention to begin issuing a biometric-enabled smart chip passport
in 2005. This passport initiative, however, does not prevent the government from
implementing additional and overlapping ‘proof-of-status’ technologies in the future. 
Risk technologies like biometrics facilitate the expedient collection, instantaneous
transfer, and wider control of personal information. Towards the end of his life, Michel
Foucault (1978) began to conceive of politics in terms of biopower. Biopower is a power
exercised over a whole population so that individuality is constitutionally imbricated with
state management practices. Biopower marks a transformation of the state, which replaces
state power over death with the power of surveillance, classification, and sorting. Thus,
biopower is a power ‘to make live and let die’ which draws upon the anatomical
characteristics of the subject population being administered. Foucault’s genealogical
method preempted him from making anything but antiquated claims about information
technologies, but the rise of biometrics in some ways vindicates Foucault’s thesis about the
relationship between the body and the state. New biometric technologies are increasingly
utilized to verify identity and shape mobility inside and outside zones of inclusion and
exclusion (of which the state is certainly one). That biometrics have fast become a staple
of security policy speaks to how securitization has penetrated the minds of policy makers,
but also suggests the degree to which the bodies of the body politic are increasingly
employed as an instrument of governance over and against themselves.
To illustrate how new surveillance technologies can utilize biometric capabilities within
the context of the state regulation of people and information flows, we examine the drive
for a Canadian national ID card. Although 9/11 provided a new impetus for ID cards
3 In 1995, former Prime Minister Chrétien and former President Clinton signed an accord entitled Our
Shared Border (1995) that largely set the policy groundwork for another part of the U.S. - Canada
Smart Border/30 Point Action Plan declaration of 2001 – the so-called ‘safe third country provision’
(The White House, 2001). What the declaration achieves in this regard is the significant reduction of
Canadian refugee claimants passing through the U.S.A, because claimants must declare refugee status
in the first country. Otherwise, claimants will be turned back at each subsequent border they try to
cross. 
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around the world, the push to augment surveillance systems and introduce ID cards in
many countries predated the events of 9/11 by a decade or more. Although they are not the
only possible technology that may be utilized in the future, nation-states around the world
have implemented national ID cards, and many others have plans to do so (see below).
There are key analytical distinctions to be made between, biometric national ID cards and
smart chip passports, for instance, but conceptualizing securitization as an inherently
ideological process allows for all new forms of state surveillance to be exposed as latent
national security practices. Because these practices are ideological, and because the
purpose of ‘proof-of-status’ technologies is to verify identification in relation to the state,
the debate over, and potential deployment of, biometric national ID cards in Canada
presents real, material implications for citizenship, social justice, and human rights.
Biometrics, International Securitization, and the National ID Card in Canada 
Governments and technology sectors have shown recurring interest in national identity
cards to improve domestic security, to reduce fraud and identity theft, and to prevent
‘illegal’ im/migration (Lyon, 1993). Whereas smart chip passports operate more or less
like paper-based passports, save for the introduction of biometric identifiers that makes
forgery more difficult (but not impossible), national ID cards act as both internal and
external devices of control. This implies that national ID cards could be used to enfaorce
intermittent checks on human movement within the nation-state (Torpey, 2000:165), and
that ID cards could apply to mobility beyond the nation-state and across international
borders (i.e. mobility in the European Union). ID cards differ from passports in that they
can also encode entitlement to certain political (i.e. voting) and social rights (i.e. welfare)
(Stadler and Lyon, 2003). ID cards would replace entitlement cards and resident cards,
incorporating the functions served by those cards into one device. Whether the card is
voluntary or not in a given country depends on what other purposes it is used for (i.e. ID
cards may incorporate medical information) and what other forms of identification are
widely used (i.e. drivers licenses). Electronic cards enable more effective administration
of personal data.4 Biometric cards are the ultimate in ‘proof of status’ technology, as
identity is verified using one’s own bodily features. 
4 The proponents of national ID cards are quick to remark the multiple benefits of such devices. For
instance, in the conclusion to his book Card-Carrying Americans, Joseph W. Eaton (1986: 206) argues
that national ID cards could allow for better access to governmental entitlement programs, could
improve the equity of tax payments, could deter professional burglars, and could reduce the incidence
of “fraud, misrepresentation, computer crime and terrorism”. Likewise, Amitai Etzioni (1999, Chapter
4) argues that implementing ID cards would reduce criminality, child abuse and sex offenses, tax
evasion, nonpayment of child support, illegal gun sales, illegal immigration, welfare fraud, identity
theft, and credit card fraud. Such endorsements tend to see ID cards as a technological fix capable of
solving all ‘social problems’ without acknowledging that all of these ‘social problems’ still occur in
countries which have had tamper-proof national ID cards for decades. The benefits of new ‘proof of
s t a t u s ’ technologies must be considered against drawbacks that could accompany their
implementation.
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The ability of states to uniquely identify persons –citizens and non-citizens– “is at the
heart of the process whereby states . . . have succeeded over time in monopolizing the
legitimate means of movement in the modern world” (Torpey, 2000:17). In Britain, for
instance, ID cards were temporarily introduced during the First and Second World Wars
(Agar, 2001:101). Sixty years after the end of WWII, and despite an estimated cost of 3
billion pounds, the U.K. House of Commons has approved a National Identification Bill
that eases the implementation of biometric national ID cards and poses serious
implications for immigration procedures (see Privacy International, 2005). This current
initiative began in 2003 when Home Office Secretary David Blunkett tried to introduce
biometric national ID cards by issuing them with all new drivers licenses and/or passports
(Times-Colonist, April 11, 2004, D4). The Home Office cited the prevention of illegal
working and im/migration as top priorities (Home Office, 2004). 
In other countries, ID cards serve drastically different functions. In the case of Rwandan
genocide, those with “Tutsi” marked on their identity cards were generally killed
(Longman, 2001:355). ID cards were used to dehumanize through categorization those
oppressed in apartheid South Africa (Bowker and Star, 1999). Greece, which records
religious affiliation on its national ID card, has been accused of discriminating against
people who are not Greek Orthodox (The Gazette, November 21, 2003. A27). Trying to
curtail rural to urban migration, China is pursuing an ID card program in which the vital
information of all Chinese citizens will be made available to authorities anywhere in the
country via a high-powered micro chip (Lyon, 2004). The ID card program may be used
to reinforce China’s Household Registration System, or hukou system, which has been
used since the 1950s to control internal migration and privilege the official urban
population (see also Treiman and Wu, 2004; Wang, 2004). Germany has had a compulsory
ID card since 1987, but the existing card will soon be upgraded to include a biometric
identifier. Malaysia began to introduce a multi-purpose ‘smart’ card in 2001 (Stadler and
Lyon, 2003:81). Incorporating national ID, driver’s license, passport information, and,
potentially, health information in the future, the card has not yet been fully implemented.
Hong Kong, Singapore, and Thailand each have hi-tech ID card systems (Stadler and
Lyon, 2003).
National ID card initiatives have also failed, or been forestalled, in some countries. In
1996, for example, the South Korean government launched an electronic ID card
campaign that would have seen forty-two items of personal data from six databases
merged into a single device. Opposition groups protested the government’s decision, and
the government abandoned the project in 1999 (Kim, 2004: 208). The ‘Australia Card’,
too, was defeated as excessive and potentially authoritarian in 1986 (Lyon, 2004). The
Japanese government continues to experience civil disobedience over their proposed ID
card (Lyon and Wood, forthcoming). In 1998, public protest halted a national ID card
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initiative in Taiwan (Stadler and Lyon, 2003: 81). And despite claims by Etzioni (1999)
that biometrics ID cards are ‘superior’ and ‘common-sense’ forms of surveillance, the
U.S.A. has yet to introduce a biometric ID card. However, the Office of Homeland
Security, the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators, and the Justice
Department are working to turn state drivers licenses into ID cards that would contain
standardized data and security information linked to a national identification system
(Stadler and Lyon, 2003: 82). Other countries, such as Italy and Finland, have had national
ID cards for decades. Italy may soon upgrade its card and incorporate a digitized
fingerprint identifier (House of Commons, 2003a: 38). Patterns of adoption and non-
adoption vary depending on political, cultural, and economic factors.
The Drive for a National ID Card in Canada 
In Canada, the drive for a national ID card system has progressed and stalled several times
over the past decade. The idea originated in 1994 in Canada in the Canadian Passport
Office, and it was recommended that the wallet-sized identity cards bear digital ‘hand
prints’ and digital photographs. Scanning machines were to be implemented at customs
and immigration counters. The national ID card would complement, rather than replace,
the old passport system (Edmonton Journal, June 5, 1994, B4). Bypassing long
immigration control lineups was identified as a key benefit. In 1995, then-Ontario Premier
Mike Harris re-proposed the question of a biometric national ID card (Times-Colonist,
July 15, 1995, A1), and in 1996 he proposed an ‘Ontario card’ to replace health cards,
drivers licenses, welfare identification and seniors’ cards (The Ottawa Citizen, February
14, 1996, A10). Then Privacy Commissioner of Canada Bruce Phillips argued that a
provincial card conjured ideas of how Nazis used Dutch administration systems to locate
and persecute Jewish persons during WWII (Toronto Star, July 14, 1995, A12). 
In 1999, the Standing Committee on Human Resource Development considered a proposal
entitled Beyond the Numbers: The Future of the Social Insurance Number System in
Canada, which sought to replace the Canadian Social Insurance Number (SIN) with a
biometric national identity card. SINs were designed as reference numbers for the Canada
Pension Plan and for various employment programs in the 1960s. Today, SINs are
necessary when filling out government forms and are sometimes requested when obtaining
bank services, applying for employment, etc. Supporting the idea, and citing “the social
insurance card scam,” “the refugee scam,, “the welfare scam,” and the “health care scam”
as serious social problems, Financial Post columnist Diane Francis argued that, unless
Canada implemented “one card and a national computer system linking all government
entitlement programs,” it would continue to be “a sitting duck for the desperate and the
desperado” (The Windsor Star, May 25, 1999, A8; National Post, April 24, 1999, D3). In
the House of Commons, however, the government rejected the idea of issuing a new ID
card with biometric identification, because the cost of issuing a biometric SIN card to over
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30 million potential users was estimated at somewhere between $1.2 billion and $3.6
billion (excluding periodic re-registration costs) (see House of Commons, 2003b).
In November 2002, then-Minister of Citizenship and Immigration Denis Coderre
reintroduced the issue of biometric national ID cards to Canadians. Although identity theft
and fraud were pushed as the big issues (Calgary Herald, February 6, 2003, A1), satisfying
the American preoccupation with border securitization post-9/11 was the driving impetus.
Replacing the citizen certificate card, Coderre purported, the new biometric national ID
card would be modeled on the ‘Maple Leaf’ card.5 In the media, Coderre conflated
biometric national ID cards with drivers’ licenses in order to normalize the idea (National
Post, November 15, 2002, A8). George Radwanski, then-Privacy Commissioner of
Canada, argued that the card would move Canada towards authoritarianism (The Ottawa
Citizen, March 19, 2003, A11). Coderre stressed that a debate was needed, and suggested
that the House of Commons Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration was an
appropriate forum. The Committee took up the task.
In July of 2003, while the Standing Committee was visiting six European capitals to
collect information about national ID cards, EKOS Research Associates released a report
showing that 7 out of 10 Canadians favored a biometric national ID card (EKOS, 2003;
Edmonton Journal, July 27, 2003, A6). The extensive report, costing the Citizenship and
Immigration department $93,500, included telephone polling and focus groups held earlier
that year. Support was noticeably lower in the Western provinces. A Pollara group poll in
the same year claimed similar results (Public Policy Forum, 2003). Regarding the reports,
however, it is not clear if Canadians had a strong understanding of exactly what biometrics
do and the potential of biometrics to connect individuals and groups to centers of power
and information (Zureik and Hindle, 2004: 132). The Standing Committee on Citizenship
and Immigration doubted the usefulness of the EKOS report because it asked a number of
leading questions.
The ideological underpinnings of the ID card as a national security project continued to
resonate. Referencing national ID cards, Coderre told the media, “It’s not about building
walls; it’s about controlling doors to make sure that people who are coming for the wrong
5 In March 2002, the now infamous ‘Maple Leaf’ permanent resident card for landed immigrants was
given life in a Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration report entitled Building a Nation:
The Regulations under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (Building a Nation, 2002). The
‘Maple Leaf’ card is not a national ID card but is a ‘proof of status’ device illustrative of the
relationship between surveillance and citizenship. Replacing the paper document used by landed
immigrants, the ‘Maple Leaf’ card is a wallet-sized, plastic photo ID with a number of fraud-resistant
features. The new card was ushered in by the federal government in response to pressure from the
U.S.A. New immigrants in Canada would be issued the ‘Maple Leaf’ card as part of their landing
process, as would other recent immigrants. The irony is that, despite the high cost of the ‘Maple Leaf’
card (which features information locked into a magnetic strip and embedded anti-duplication
devices), the card was already being counterfeited two months after introduction and before the
system was even fully implemented.
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reasons face the consequences” (Daily News, April 19, 2003, A2). Inter-discursively
coupled with other speeches that spoke of “illegal im/migrants,” Coderre’s comments
suggested that the majority of “non-Canadians” might be coming here for the “wrong
reasons.” There was still, however, a wave of opposition that Coderre would have to ride
out if he was to see his ID card plan go through. As part of his race to be leader of the
federal Liberal party, Paul Martin questioned the biometric national ID card initiative (The
Windsor Star, July 25, 2003, B1). The then interim Privacy Commissioner of Canada,
Robert Marleau, urged Parliament to reject the ID card plan (National Post, September 22,
2003, A11). His indications that the ID card plan would be too costly and bureaucratically
complicated were prescient (The Windsor Star, September 19, 2003, A13). Despite her role
in mobilizing the ‘Maple Leaf’ permanent resident card, Customs and Revenue Minister
Elinor Caplan had flatly refuted the idea of a biometric national ID card (Calgary Herald,
November 18, 2002, A6). Coderre’s ID card plan that received a rough ride in the House
of Commons from the very beginning (The Gazette, February 7, 2003, A13; The Gazette,
November 19, 2002, A13).
At the same time that Coderre was indicating to a Citizenship and Immigration
Consultation Forum in Ottawa that biometric national ID cards in Canada were inevitable
(The Gazette, October 9, 2003, A13), the Standing Committee on Citizenship and
Immigration released its report. Having met with 48 associations or individuals in Canada
and another 89 internationally, the report came to a number of critical conclusions (see
House of Commons, 2003a: 9-14), which are hereafter paraphrased: A national ID card
does not prevent individuals from committing a terrorist act once they have the card.
Moreover, if it cannot be guaranteed that the foundational documents used to obtain a
national identity card are in fact legitimate, it would seem senseless to have an expensive
‘proof of status’ identification system in place. A much more massive and costly
bureaucracy would be needed to administer the law and protect personal information. It is
not impossible to counterfeit even the most technologically advanced cards, and reliance
on a single card could actually increase counterfeiting and identity theft. A biometric
national ID card would seem redundant given the host of other surveillance mechanisms
being implemented around the globe. False rejects and false accepts are still an issue with
biometric devices. Even a smile can throw off such devices.6
Moreover, the proposed national ID card system would have come with an estimated $7
billion dollar price tag (Kamloops Daily News, November 10, 2003, B2). In the House of
Commons, Canadian Alliance MP Diane Ablonczy commented that the cost of the card
could finance the entire immigration system for 20 years (Guardian, October 8, 2003, A5).
6 It is for this reason that the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) introduced new
specifications for passport photos to 188 member states around the world (Edmonton Journal, August
27, 2003, A2). Neutral expressions increase the reliability of facial recognition systems. It must also
be noted that eye, fingerprint, and handprint forms of biometric recognition technologies have higher
reliability rates.
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NDP MP Pat Martin, a member of the House of Commons Standing Committee on
Citizenship and Immigration, called it “a boondoggle in the making” (Toronto Star,
October 7, 2003, A6). Coderre was quick to downplay the report in the media. Despite
Coderre’s efforts, this report seemed to mark the end of his biometric national ID card
dream.
In the summer of 2004, however, the American Association of Motor Ve h i c l e
Administrators (AAMVA), a quasi-governmental body whose members are mainly state
and provincial ministries of transportation, finished the first stage of a multi-year
evaluation to measure whether a common biometric license could be implemented across
AAMVA jurisdictions (National Post, July 8, 2004, A4). These jurisdictions include
Canadian provinces. The biometric license would act as a sort of pan-American biometric
national ID card in the sense that the information subjects would still be represented on the
basis of national identification, but their data would also be accessible by a host of extra-
Canadian agents and agencies. The move came at the same time that the Ontario
government suggested it might merge health and drivers’ information in a single biometric
ID card (The Ottawa Citizen, July 8, 2004, A1). The debate over a national ID card system
and/or similar systems in Canada is far from over.
Making Sense of the Debate
Colin J. Bennett (1997) has developed four hypotheses for trying to understand the pattern
of identity card adoption and non-adoption in advanced industrial states. First, he argues
that ID cards require continuous bureaucratic cooperation over data sharing and
processing. New technologies make this sort of cooperation much easier. Second, national
ID cards are likely to be adopted where policy-making procedures are more centralized.
The federal structure of states such as Canada, Australia, and the U.S.A. goes some way
to explaining why biometric ID cards have not been adopted in these countries until now:
the events of 9/11 had a centralizing effect on security, defense, and im/migration policy,
suspending the separation of administrative powers in this regard. Third, ID cards may be
prevalent where private sector influence is more apparent. Certainly the commitment to
biometric technologies in the U.S. - Canada Smart Border/30 Point Action Plan (The
White House, 2001) and the Securing an Open Society (Privy Council Office of the
Government of Canada, 2004) documents would imply a strong private/public sector
rapport. Trade associations, such as the Toronto-based Advanced Card Technology
Association of Canada (2005), act as de facto lobby groups, pressuring government to buy
products. Finally, the pre-existing legacies of past surveillance policies should not be
underplayed. That the UK employed national ID cards during WWI and WWII and
Canada did not goes some way to explaining why a biometric national ID card proposal is
now being ushered through the UK House of Commons but the same idea has failed in
Canada. When an existing card surveillance infrastructure does not exist, cost also
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becomes an issue. 
The practicalities of identity card adoption/non-adoption are important for understanding
the recurring debates over national ID cards. Sometimes the debate polarizes. At other
times, ‘national’ and ‘special’ interests converge and agree upon specific policy issues.
National ID card adoption can be the outcome. Many policy-makers and government
officials view biometric national ID cards as necessary to control unmanageable levels of
im/migration flows. The hypotheses stated above regarding adoption/non-adoption also
suggest a larger trend regarding surveillance and citizenship policies in liberal
democracies. State politics have undergone a transformation since the 1970s. The ‘New
Right Project’ that has replaced the Keynesian welfare state (i.e. globalization-from-
above) is an “ . . . economic philosophy that calls for cuts to government spending…the
restructuring of core areas of the welfare state . . . to make them more cost sensitive and
accountable to the logic of the marketplace” (Knight, 1998:106). Who benefits from this
reorganization of capital, and how does it affect the state? Whose security is enacted by
the adoption of ‘proof of status’ ID card technologies? Does the implementation of
surveillance measures in the name of national security jeopardize other forms of security
that sustain life inside state forms of political association? 
Securing Citizenship vs. the Securitization of Citizenship
The issue of citizenship and its connections with intensified state surveillance is under-
theorized and meagerly researched. Citizenship, traditionally conceived, is membership
within an internationally recognized bordered territory where the citizen-subject is
accorded certain rights if a state agency recognizes the citizen-subject as such. In general
terms, surveillance is “any collection and processing of personal data . . . for the purposes
of influencing or managing those whose data have been garnered” (Lyon, 2001: 2;
Giddens, 1981: 5, 1991: 15). In relation to the state, surveillance is better understood as
the means by which centralized and centralizing organizations keep track of and construct
citizens (Zureik, 2001). Nation-states, in particular, must codify the characteristics of their
imagined community in order to develop “the capacities necessary to monopolize the
authority to regulate movement” (Torpey, 2000:7). The concentration of political authority
in the bureaucratic/information state is a precondition for universal citizenship rights
(Dandeker, 1990: 217). However, administrative forms of surveillance do pre-date the
formation of liberal-democratic nation-states, and it is hard to see early forms of census-
taking and civil registration as overt means of social control (Higgs, 2001). Nevertheless,
surveillance and citizenship are interrelated. Moreover, while citizenship policies are
reconstituted when governments change, citizenship itself is not reducible to government
goods. 
From the liberal-democratic perspective, surveillance determines how states identify who
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to accord citizenship rights to. This is especially true of the welfare state, that historical
spatialization of sovereignty in which citizenship became a form of entitlement (Bell,
1976). But this is equally true of the post-welfare (read neo-liberal) state: our current
spatialization of sovereignty in which citizenship is still a form of entitlement, except that
the entitlement is not extended to all who struggle for it who need it. Despite the
continuing existence of the state as a form of political association and administration, it
can no longer be argued that claims to citizenship are best achieved via the sovereign state
(also see Beck, 1992). As Bryan Turner (1990: 199) puts it, narrowly associating
citizenship with the sovereign state or other ruling class strategies “precludes, or restricts,
any analysis of citizenship from below as a consequence of social struggles over
resources.” 
T.H. Marshall’s seminal work in the area of citizenship studies is characteristic of a view
that associates citizenship with the Westphalian state system (Kymlicka and Norman,
1995). In Marshall’s (1950: 8) historical account of modern citizenship, he asserts, “the
inequality of social class may be acceptable provided the equality of citizenship is
recognized.” For Marshall, the modern polity has been shaped by the successive
development of civil, political, and social rights, all of which constitute citizenship rights.
Civil rights refer to equality before the law. Political rights refer to enfranchisement and
the right to organize political parties. Social rights refer to welfare rights: “the provision
of ‘social services’, unemployment benefit and sickness pay” (Giddens, 1981: 227).
Marshall saw social rights in particular as a means of “eroding the most glaring
inequalities of modern capitalism and of building social solidarity beyond the confines of
ethnic or class particularisms” (Brodie, 2002: 380). Social rights after WWII became
associated with the sort of security citizens could expect from their states, as states could
no longer realistically protect their citizens from outside risks. The globalization of risk
thus proves the artificiality of Marshall’s civil-political-social triad and reveals how
contemporary social life involves experiences that subsume and mix Marshall’s
dimensions of citizenship (Urry, 2000:69). Terrorism is only one of these risks. The
political and socio-cultural fields have changed dramatically since Marshall’s time, and the
universalizing logic of citizenship characteristic of the welfare state has been
problematized. A Marshallian approach is, therefore, limited in interpreting the
relationship between new state surveillance measures and citizenship.
The concomitant emergence of neo-liberal and neo-conservative ideology after the 1973
oil crisis and ensuing recession greatly affected citizenship, governmental responses to it,
and government itself. Power shifted up to transnationals, over to the private sector, and
down to the local (Brodie, 2000: 110; Sassen, 1996). The citizenship concept is now
contested in the literature (see Mann, 1987; Turner, 1993), and it is possible to speak of
ecological, technological, urban, minority, and sexual citizenships, among others.
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Defining citizenship solely is relation to nationality, sovereignty, or the nation-state is
empirically passé (Delanty, 2001). Though new surveillance projects post-9/11 indicate a
marked return to the sovereign capabilities of the nation-state over the individual, the
relationship between citizenship and surveillance does not exist as it did before the
transformations of the late 20th and early 21st centuries. Risk technologies like biometrics
are very much implicated in this transformation of government.
Concerned with how new biometric technologies and the “securitization of the inside”
post-9/11 are affecting access to citizenship rights, Benjamin Muller (2004) suggests that
we are witnessing a shift from a politics of citizenship to a politics of identity management.
The uniform social citizenship that was the objective of the citizen-forming strategies of
the 20th century is jeopardized by the state’s application of biometrics – technologies
which are manifestations of a new culture of world-wide risk management. By shifting the
emphasis of identity politics from identity to authentification, biometric technologies
disguise and advance the restrictive aspects of contemporary securitized citizenship
(Muller, 2004: 286; Lyon, 2003a: 163). In the unending ‘War on Terror’, biometric ‘proof
of status’ technologies can mask the discriminatory character of the securitization of
citizenship in a professional and scientific discourse (Muller, 2004: 284). Identity
management strategies are less concerned with origin than with discriminating between
qualified and disqualified bodies vis a vis biometric identifiers. Persons fleeing their home
countries for political or economic reasons will experience difficulties seeking asylum in
host countries if they have not attained one of these “proof of status” devices. 
The relationships between biometric national ID cards and citizenship are multiple. First,
and most pertinently, entitlement to and actualization of basic citizenship rights may soon
be impossible without possession of a biometric national ID card and/or similar “proof of
status” technology. Second, the biometric function of ID cards challenges theorists to
rethink modern ontologies of the body, information, and the relationship of these
ontologies to the broader issues of security and border politics (van der Ploeg, 2003).
Under these conditions, and third, technological citizenship is not simply about how to
best harness new technologies in democratic ways or how to limit technologies that
infringe on civil rights. Approached another way, technological citizenship is also about
limiting the use of technologies that have the potential to subordinate portions of the
population (Isin and Wood, 1999: 113; Lyon, 2003a: 160). For these reasons, policy-
makers should turn their attention to how information and communication technologies
affect the relationships among nation-states, surveillance, and citizenship. 
The recurring interest in and widespread adoption of national ID cards partially
substantiates Gary Marx’s (1988) claim that new surveillance technologies trigger a shift
from targeting specific suspects to categorical suspicion. At the same time, national
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security practices are legitimized by constructing ethno-cultural minorities, political foes,
and non-citizens as security risks, and thus work to exacerbate anxiety concerning
im/migration flows. Research has shown that since 1999 CanWest Communications in
particular has published positions more unfavorable towards Muslims than have other
mass media ventures (Helley, 2004). Hate crimes against Muslims were rampant in
America post-9/11 (Ahmad, 2002). The kidnapping of Maher Arar by United States
government officials who then sent him to Syria to be interrogated and tortured is perhaps
the definitive manifestation of the clandestine profiling of Muslims and other “persons of
interest” in North America (Whitaker, 2003). In Canada, not all persons share the same
probability of being classified a risky non-citizen, and refugee claimants in particular are
vulnerable to these sorts of profiling.
“Proof of status” surveillance technologies such as biometric national ID cards threaten the
very core of the citizenship provisions that are supposed to be sacred in liberal
democracies. Such technologies in no way impede the global crisis of stateless persons.
We are not naively advocating a return to the liberal welfare state of decades past as a
remedy to this crisis, as it has been demonstrated that the liberal welfare state is only
capable of surface reallocations of economic goods and surface reallocations of respect to
existing identity groups (Fraser, 1997). Rather, we are arguing that application of
surveillance technologies in the areas of border security and im/migration today confronts
us with new questions—questions that are inherently political. Most importantly, the
question “Who has the legitimate authority to collect our personal information and
administer us across space and time based on that information?” must not fall prey to
liberalist-doxic common-sense. Answers to these questions are best addressed by thinking
outside the conceptual confines of the nation-state.
The way in which people understand their conditions of existence is a site of struggle
where those conditions can be either reproduced or transformed. Inverting Hobbes’(1952:
153) infamous assertion that the “the essential rights of sovereignty” must be obeyed at all
costs or else “every man [sic] returneth into the condition and calamity of war with every
other,” we might ask what legitimacy do state agencies have if they cannot internally
protect the rights and welfare of their current and future citizens? If the ability of citizens
to access citizenship rights is jeopardized by state introduction of technologically
advanced surveillance devices, then does it make sense to understand the state as the
legitimate unit of sovereignty? 
State sovereignty is historically constituted and variable, so to take sovereignty for granted
is to take politics for granted as well (Walker, 2000; 1993). Rapid modernization is
jeopardizing its own basic principles. It cannot be claimed, then, that the expansion of
citizenship goes neatly hand in hand with the processes of modernization. The introduction
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of biometric national ID cards and other “proof of status” surveillance technologies
threatens the very spatializations of modern sovereignty these technologies purport to
defend in the name of national security (Huysmans, 2004). To sit back and watch while
states retract citizenship rights is to forsake the struggles of those who have fought for
social welfare, for enfranchisement, and for the other universal rights that are associated
with what it means to be a citizen in a liberal democracy. More significantly, if it is the
case that advanced post-industrial states are moving towards identity management by
means of biometric national ID cards and similar devices (a securitization rather than a
securing of citizenship), then people must initiate local and participatory means of
redressing economic and cultural injustices that exceed the tightfisted direction in which
liberal democracies have been headed for some time. Indeed, the language of rights and
state-based citizenship is not sufficient for those on the left interested in a politics beyond
the liberal democratic state (Vahabzadeh, 2000; 2003). That “proof of status” state
surveillance devices can restrict access to citizenship while persisting under the rhetorical
language of rights speaks to the contradictions that are the life-blood of liberal democracy.
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CONGRATULATORY NOTE
Meg Luxton of York University, a member of the Society for Socialist Studies has been
given the Sarah Shorten Award for outstanding achievements in the promotion of the
advancement of women in Canadian universities and colleges. This was awarded to her by
the Canadian Association of University Teachers.
Scholarship, teaching, leadership and activism have been the mainstay of Luxton's life.
She is one of the founders of the graduate programme in women's studies at York, and has
been key to furthering feminist scholarship. Her half-dozen books, as well as numerous
articles and book chapters, cover a wide range of topics that advance the cause of women.
For more than 30 years, Luxton has given tirelessly of her time and energy, from
community-based activism to organizational leadership in her faculty association, to the
fight for women's rights. Luxton received the award in Ottawa on April 29, 2005.
The award is dedicated to the late Sarah Shorten, who served as vice-president and
president of CAUT in the 1980s.
